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Abstract 
 
We investigate the impact of Certificate of Need (CON) Law and its stringency on 
Inpatient service utilization measured by hospital occupancy.  We show that on average the CON 
legislation reduces utilization in Inpatient units.  Besides, we do not find sufficient statistical 
evidence to reject the exogenous assumption of CON and its features. Furthermore, we confirm 
the qualitative nature of these key findings by an analysis featuring Inpatient length of stay 
(LOS). Other findings include the following: Inpatient utilization is positively related to 
proportion of females in a state and the proportion of Asian-Americans; a statistically significant 
positive relationship exists between GDP and utilization and a negative one is noted between 
utilization and proportion of population on Medicare; a statistically significant positive 
relationship is noted between population availing ED services in a state and Inpatient utilization; 
                                                          
1
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as the number of democratic senators in a state increases, it has a negative impact on utilization 
of Inpatient services.   
Keywords: CON Law; Health Policy; Utilization; Inpatient Care. 
JEL classification: I11, I18 
 
I. Introduction 
The U.S. spends more on healthcare than any other country in the world. To put it in perspective, 
as per a study by the Centers of Diseases Control and Prevention, it accounts for more than 17% 
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (NCHS, 2012). All other economic sectors lag behind 
healthcare when it comes to spending. Nearly one-third of this is attributed to Inpatient hospital 
services and related utilization.  Specifically, between 1997 and 2011, aggregate inflation 
adjusted hospital costs grew by 3.6 percent annually (Weis, Barrett and Steiner, 2014). It would 
be somewhat consoling if quality of healthcare outcomes is comparable with the utilization rates 
but that is not the case either. United States lags behind all other industrialized nations in this 
regard (OECD, 2009).  
Healthcare regulation is usually a strategy that the governments employ to make sure the 
utilization and related costs do not get out of hand. As can be expected United States is no 
stranger to this. A number of laws have been implemented over the years with varied goals in 
mind. The 1946 federal Hill-Burton program for instance was aimed at funding new hospital 
construction in areas that most needed it.  It was designed to provide funds for new hospital 
construction in such areas. However, a state would only receive these funds if they adopted a 
health plan that would evaluate the proposed projects (Lave and Lave, 1974). Another significant 
milestone in this regard was the Certificate of Need Law. The National Health Planning and 
Resource Development Act (NHPA) passed this law in 1974 to curtail unnecessary spending.  
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The primary goal with this law was to ensure availability of healthcare services while controlling 
for unnecessary capacity, expensive duplication of services and improving quality of care and 
competition (Conover and Sloan, 1998).   Some states have repealed this law but then thirty six 
of them still pursue the law in various fashions and it continues to have an impact on their 
healthcare industry. While one would presume that these repeal and continuance decisions were 
backed by concrete evidence, analysis of extant literature portrays a different story altogether. 
Among other issues, one finds that a comprehensive analysis of the impact of CON Law is 
notably lacking.
2
 Given the absence of a complete investigation of this profound issue, literature 
unsurprisingly includes studies that find the law to be favorable to the healthcare industry and 
then those that believe it has negatively impacted the healthcare industry without a clear 
frontrunner.  We provide a few examples for both sides of the aisle on relevant healthcare issues 
such as entry to market, competition, cost of care and quality of care. 
The Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission (2004) and Zeta (2008) point 
out that CON Law leads to higher prices as it protects incumbents by acting as a barrier to entry.  
Adding support to this argument, Greenberg (1998) points out that CON Law makes it difficult 
for hospitals to enter the healthcare market or for an existing hospital to justify expenditures with 
regard to a medical procedure or service that is already available at other hospitals. Vaughan-
Sarrazin et al. (2002) find a negative impact of the law on health outcomes. In their study 
featuring Coronary Artery Bypass Graft surgery (CABG) patients, they find the mortality rates of 
the CABG patients to be 22% higher in states with CON compared to those that don’t. The 
proponents of the law argue that that the law is able to deter excessive investments in expensive 
technologies. Their argument is rooted in the ability of hospitals to compete on the basis of non-
                                                          
2
 Hellinger (2009) and Smith and Forgione (2009) provide a detailed overview of CON Law and 
changes the law has gone through over the years since its enactment.   
Page 4 of 52 
 
price attributes and this allowing them to easily pass on the cost of their investment to the 
consumers (or the insurers).  Ferrier et al. (2010) similarly find CON Law to have a positive 
impact on healthcare costs. Specifically, they are able to show that states with CON Law are able 
to accomplish a more efficient allocation of resources and outputs than those without the law. 
Additionally, they note that the duration of the law in a state has a positive statistical 
significance. Paul et al. (2014) find that CON Law has a statistically significant negative impact 
on Emergency Department (ED) average Length of Stay (LOS) and therefore positively impacts 
health care quality in ED. 
The primary motivation of this study is an empirical analysis of the impact of CON Law 
on Inpatient utilization. An additional aspect that makes this analysis interesting and worthwhile 
is the negative correlation noted between quality of Inpatient care and utilization in extant 
literature (Scholle et al. 2005). The same directional nature is observed to hold between average 
length of Inpatient stay and quality of care delivery (Coffman and Rundall, 2005; White and 
Glazier, 2011). We would like to study given this contrast, how does CON Law impact 
utilization measured by hospital occupancy and to check the robustness of these findings via an 
analysis focusing on a different measure of utilization, average LOS. Additional motivation is 
provided by findings in extant literature featuring EDs that demonstrate a positive impact of 
CON Law on quality of care (Paul et al., 2014).   
Given that two states could vary with regard to the stringency with which they enforce 
the law, we control not only whether a state has CON law or not, but also we factor in the 
thresholds on expenditures that states with CON have put into place. Any expenditure request 
beyond these thresholds would have to go through a formal review. Therefore, a hospital or 
healthcare provider would have to obtain approvals from the government if they were 
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considering significant additions to their capacity or entering a new service market. To clarify, a 
higher threshold represents less stringent law as in such a scenario only a handful projects would 
have to go through a formal review. In this study, we devote our attention to stringency as it 
applies to thresholds on service expenditures
3
. We also account for both the supply and demand 
side of the Inpatient market in addition to the features of the law.  These variables include but are 
not limited to health care supply, economic indicators, demographic characteristics, health status, 
health insurance coverage of local population, and state political environment/policy based 
variables.  Finally, given the possibility of unobserved state heterogeneity, we extend our 
analysis by treating CON Indicator and its stringency as endogenous, and then test for their 
endogeneity.   
 
II. Data and Summary Statistics 
In this study, we investigate the impact of CON Law on Inpatient utilization or 
occupancy of hospital inpatient resources in the United States using hospital level data.  We 
measure utilization as follows for each hospital:  (            [
                    
                 
]) following 
extant literature (Examples include Sampson et al., 2006; Connecticut Department of Public 
Health, 2013 among others).  
Our outcome measure is built using Inpatient Days data of hospitals in each state for the 
years 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2009.   Our key variables of interest are CON Law and its 
                                                          
3
 CON Law is usually associated with three thresholds: one to curb capital spending (for example, hospital expands 
its capacity using a loan and has to pay interest), one for equipment purchases and the third featuring service related 
expenditures.  The one associated with equipment by definition is not relevant to Inpatient care but rather to 
emergency departments.  Therefore, we did not include this measure in this research. In light of concerns regarding 
the consistency of threshold associated with capital spending over the time period in this study, we did not 
incorporate it either.  Our communication with the American Health Planning Association from whom this data was 
obtained did not help resolve these inconsistency concerns.  
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stringency.  We use a binary variable to describe whether a state has a CON Law or not.   The 
stringency of CON Law is measured by an index based on the CON threshold for service related 
expenditures in the state, beyond which hospitals need to get permission from the state 
government if they plan to acquire new service.    This threshold varies across states, whereas a 
small value of this threshold indicates a relatively stringent CON Law, while a large value of this 
threshold indicates a relatively lenient version of the law.  It is important to include a measure on 
this feature of CON Law not only to differentiate between states with CON Law but also to 
differentiate between states with and without CON Law. This is mainly because there exist some 
states with CON Law that have a high threshold on new service related spending, which means 
very few service acquisitions are subject to review. These states are therefore not very different 
from states without CON Law where no spending is subject to review.  The index of the 
threshold on service spending is defined as follows: 
(                        [
                                             
                         
]).  
We construct the measure of CON Stringency in this way, such that the meaning of 
increase in this index is similar to that in CON Indicator, where 0 implies a lenient environment 
and 1 implies a stringent one. Intuitively, Inpatient care utilization could be affected by both the 
demand and supply side of the Inpatient care market. On the supply side, we take into account 
important hospital characteristics, such as number of full time physicians; number of full time 
nurses; whether the hospital is a member of Council of Teaching Hospitals and Health Systems 
(COTH) of the Association of American Medical Colleges; whether the hospital has residency 
training approval by Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education and whether the 
hospital has accreditation by Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations 
(JCAHO)  and state characteristics such as number of teaching hospitals.  Increase in number of 
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teaching hospitals can negatively impact their turnaround rate (because of the greater role of 
resident physicians) and therefore market share of these hospitals.  On the demand side, we 
construct measures to capture the health need of the population in a given market (state).  First, 
we control for the demographic characteristics of the state population using measures on 
distributions of different age, gender and ethnicity groups.  An increase in population in a state 
increases the demand for health care and thereby can influence utilization.  Further, it is well 
known that females have more health care needs when compared to men, and hence an increase 
in their proportion might increase demand for Inpatient care and utilization (NCHS, 2012).  An 
increase in the proportion of the elderly similarly might increase the demand for Inpatient care 
and related utilization.  Health outcomes and socio-economic standing have been found to 
significantly vary by race (Census Bureau, 2013; NCHS, 2012) and therefore any substantial 
changes in the racial mix of the population can influence the demand for Inpatient care and 
related utilization.  Similarly, we consider population that avail Emergency Department (ED) 
services).  The emergency department related inputs are incorporated accounting for the fact that 
a major proportion of Inpatient volume comes from the ED and therefore the ED volume have a 
significant impact on Inpatient volume and therefore Inpatient utilization (Paul and Lin, 2012).   
Second, we include the proportion of population covered by different types of health 
insurance, which could be a natural measure of individuals’ accessibility to health care.  For 
instance, if the number of individuals with employer-provided insurance increases, it can 
potentially lead to a reduction in demand for Inpatient care as these individuals are generally 
younger and healthier.  The opposite might hold true for those on Medicaid.  We also consider 
the number of illegal immigrants (in millions) to capture the population who lack health 
insurance coverage and hence are likely to be one of the most vulnerable groups.   
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Third, we try to measure the health status of a state population using the prevalence of 
obesity, percent of population that smoke daily, percent of population that drink heavily and 
child death rate (CDC, 2014a; CDC, 2014b; CDC, 2014c; CDC, 2014d).  For instance, infant 
mortality rate is a good indicator of health status as it has been found to be directly related to 
health of expecting women which in turn is influenced by their life style and behavioral choices 
(CDC, 2014d). Another motivation for considering them in our study is the positive relationship 
noted between smoking, heavy drinking, obesity and the health care costs (NCHS, 2012).  
There is no doubt that the political and economic environment of a state could affect the 
Inpatient care market as well.  For instance, in a richer state, Inpatient care providers would have 
a stronger incentive to increase utilization of Inpatient services even if there is no real demand to 
justify it.  We use median household income
4
 to capture the economic effects.   
Also, political environment of a state could very likely influence the policies 
implemented in the Inpatient care market which could have an impact on available services and 
related utilization.  We construct several measures on the political environment of a state: 1) 
Party affiliation of the state governor and senators; 2) Voting records of the two senators from a 
state: both the number of affirmative votes and deviation of their votes. We include these 
variables in our study for the following reasons: First, voting record of senators is an indicator of 
the political climate in that state since rational senators would not vote in a manner that 
jeopardizes their chance of winning future elections.  A higher number of affirmative votes along 
with a low deviation in the voting record of the senators is an indication of agreement between 
the senators and is possibly a result of a cooperative political climate in a state, either because 
one party is overwhelmingly dominant or because both parties enjoy a working relationship.  
Legislative changes can be made relatively easily in such a state.  In such an environment, 
                                                          
4
 All variables in money terms used in our analysis have been adjusted for inflation in 1998 dollars for consistency. 
Page 9 of 52 
 
powerful (influential) groups with special interests can get laws passed or modified in their favor 
and such changes might significantly impact utilization.   
To the best of our knowledge, there is no single data set that includes all of the variables 
we need for our analysis.   Therefore, we collect information on these variables from a variety of 
sources (Appendix Table A.1).   We end up with a sample of 22639 observations at the hospital 
level, which covers the period of years: 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2009.  Note that variables 
such as population demographics,, number of illegal immigrants, and those capturing political 
and economic environment, insurance type, are collected at the state level as they cannot be 
measured at the hospital level or they are not available. Table 1 provides the summary statistics 
of our sample with a comparison between hospitals in states with and without CON Law.   A 
detailed description of the variables can be found in Appendix Table A.2. 
-----------------------Table 1 about here------------------------------ 
From Table 1 above, compared to hospitals in states without CON Law, those with CON 
Law on average have larger populations, larger black population, lower proportion of people 
covered by privately purchased health insurance, and smaller population of illegal immigrants.  
A higher proportion of hospitals in states with CON are members of council of teaching, have 
approval for resident training, have Joint Commission of Healthcare Organizations Accreditation 
(JCAHO) and are not for profit. Similarly, they have an increased number of full time physicians 
and nurses. The governors are more likely to be Democratic, and their senators seem to be more 
cooperative as well
5
. Hospitals in states with CON are also associated with 1) higher GINI 
indexes, which indicates a higher dispersion in income; 2) lower tech index, which indicates a 
slower speed to implement newer technology. 
                                                          
5
 These differences have been tested to be statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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III. Econometric Specifications 
In this empirical study, we would like to explore the relationship between CON Law and hospital 
occupancy, a measure of utilization of hospital resources. While the effect of CON Law on 
healthcare costs has been extensively investigated, to the best of our knowledge, there is no prior 
literature that studies the effects of CON Law from a utilization standpoint.  Our analysis starts 
with a binary control of CON Law as mostly used in previous studies, then we extend it with 
measures on the stringency of the law, and finally test the endogeneity of CON Law measure(s). 
In all our models, we also control for other important variables as described previously that 
measure both the demand and supply side of Inpatient care market, and economic and political 
environment of a state.   
The estimated model we start with is specified below: 
                                ,                                                                       (1) 
where HospOccit measures the utilization of Inpatient care based on the number of beds available 
in a given hospital i in time period t, CON is a dummy variable that indicates if a state has the 
CON Law or not, X includes all the other covariates, such as hospital resources and 
characteristics, population characteristics in the state where the hospital is located, and macro 
political and economic environment of the state, and ε represents the error term6.  
In order to tackle the existence of unobserved hospital heterogeneity, we extend our study 
by taking advantage the panel setting of our data.  Our model of interest is presented below: 
                                   ,                                                       (2) 
                                                          
6
 There could be some concerns about the existence of autocorrelation in the error term. We test on it and cannot 
find sufficient statistical evidence to support the existence of autocorrelation with a p-value of 0.1094. 
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where    represents time invariant unobserved hospital heterogeneity. If we assume there is no 
correlation between    and the observables, we can use the Random Effect (RE) model to 
estimate the CON Law effects. We further relax the assumption by allowing the existence of 
arbitrary relationship between    and the observables, where we use the Fixed Effect (FE) model 
to uncover the story. We use a Breusch-Pagan Test to check the existence of this unobserved 
heterogeneity of hospital and then use a Hausman type of test to compare our estimation results 
from our RE and FE models.  
It is worth noticing that CON Indicator, our key variable of interest, is time invariant in 
the periods considered in this study. Therefore, we are not able to estimate the effect of CON in 
the FE model. In order to obtain some estimates of this key variable of interest that is time 
invariant, and at the same time allowing for some relationship between the observed and the 
unobserved heterogeneity, we apply a Hausman Taylor (HT) type of model to obtain Generalized 
IV (GIV) estimates. In this model, we allow correlation to exist between time varying 
observables and unobserved heterogeneity, with an assumption that CON (indicator) is 
exogenous (uncorrelated with the unobserved heterogeneity) first
7
. We then use a Hausman type 
of test to compare the result of the HT model with that of the FE model to test the robustness of 
our results towards model specification. 
Since the decision to retain the law in a state depends on state-specific characteristics, 
some of which are unobserved (state’s attitude towards rate of Inpatient care utilization for 
instance), we cannot rule out the possibility that the CON Indicator is correlated with the error 
term in equation (1) and (2) without testing for it.  In other words, there is a possibility that the 
CON Indicator may be an endogenous variable.  If this is true then we may end up with biased 
estimates of CON Law effects if we fail to tackle this issue appropriately.  Therefore, we first use 
                                                          
7
 We treat CON indicator as an endogenous variable next and test for this endogeneity. 
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a two-stage least squares (2SLS) model
8
 to estimate the effects of the CON Law treating CON 
Law indicator as endogenous.  We then use the Durbin-Wu test to investigate whether we have 
strong empirical evidence to believe that the CON Indicator should indeed be treated as an 
endogenous variable.  The 2SLS estimation is done using the following specifications: 
Stage one:                                                            (3) 
Stage two: HospOccit =    +       ̂ +      +µit                                                          (4) 
In the first stage, we estimate the likelihood of a state having CON Law as a function of 
Instrumental Variables (IVs) and other covariates. And in the second stage, we estimate the 
Inpatient utilization as a function of the estimated likelihood of having CON Law from the first 
stage and other covariates.  Theoretically, we need to include at least one IV for each 
endogenous variable in order to identify the model.  In this specification, we use the index of 
science and technology and the GINI in a state as our IVs.   
 The following explains our motivation behind choice of these IVs i.e. why we posit that 
they are likely to influence whether a state has CON Law but not likely influence the Inpatient 
utilization is as follows: 1) The index of science and technology in a state is likely to be 
associated with the attitude of the state administration regarding how quickly new technologies 
can be adopted.  A technologically advanced state will usually have a large technology sector 
that provides both jobs and taxes.  Everything else remaining constant, such a state is less likely 
to have the law since it can hurt business interests in the state. On the other hand, states worried 
that such technology and innovation related investments do not justify the resulting benefits are 
more likely to have and continue to retain the law. These concerns that the effort to innovate 
                                                          
8
 We also used a discrete model in the first step and use the predicted probability of having CON from this stage as 
the IV in a 2SLS as a robustness check, and the findings of our main equation were consistent with those obtained 
from the 2SLS modeling specification.  The results are available upon request.  We report the results of 2SLS to 
make an easy comparison to the results of models where we control both CON Law indicator and law stringency. 
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often overtakes the effort to economize find adequate support in extant literature (Bodenheimer, 
2005). This might also lead to a scenario wherein such states are technologically less innovative 
than those without CON Law. 2) The GINI index is a measure of income dispersion in the state 
population. When GINI index of a state increases, the income inequality rises (World Bank, 
2013). In this case, it is possible that a large fraction of the population may be unable to pay for 
healthcare, particularly for inpatient services. Hospitals in states that have a higher proportion of 
low income patient base get subsidies towards the cost of care. For instance, as per the Inpatient 
Prospective Payment System (IPPS), the base payment rate (determined by the diagnosis-related 
group of a patient) to hospitals is adjusted by an add-on payment known as the disproportionate 
share hospital (DSH) adjustment (CMS, 2014). DSH basically provides for a percentage increase 
in Medicare payment for hospitals that serve a disproportionate share of low-income patients.  
Additionally, it includes a provision to increase this IPPS payment for expensive patient cases. 
Therefore, the governments of such states would have valid concerns that hospitals could easily 
pass on the cost of unnecessary treatment to them. This would in turn provide the state an 
incentive to curb excessive expansion of hospital by retaining and therefore supporting CON 
Law that helps curb such unnecessary expansion. This indicates that GINI index is less likely to 
influence the utilization but rather is more likely to impact whether a state has CON Law or not.  
We also use statistical tests to investigate the validity of these two IVs.  Finally, we use a 
Durbin-Wu (Hausman type) test to determine if there is empirical evidence to suggest that the 
CON Indicator is indeed an endogenous variable. 
We also test on the endogeneity of CON Indicator in the panel setting first in a RE 
specification and then in a HT Type of model (since our key variable is time invariant).  
Stage one:                                                               (5) 
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Stage two: HospOccit =    +       ̂ +      +   µit                                              (6) 
In the RE model where we treat the CON Indicator as the only endogenous variable, we actually 
estimate a Generalized 2SLS (G2SLS) model: first, we regress the CON Indicator on exogenous 
variables Xit and IVs; second, we regress HospOcc on the estimated CON from stage1 and Xit 
assuming no relation between all the covariates and the unobserved heterogeneity. Then we relax 
this assumption by allowing relationships between the covariates (we assume CON Indicator to 
be endogenous in this specification) and the unobserved heterogeneity in a HT Type model. We 
use a Hausman type of test to test the endogeneity of CON Indicator in both RE (by comparing it 
to the RE with CON Indicator as exogenous) and Hausman Taylor specifications (by comparing 
it to a HT model where the CON Indicator is treated as exogenous).   
Next, we extend our analysis by controlling for the stringency of the CON Law on 
service spending using an identical configuration. It is vital to take this measure of the stringency 
of CON Law into account
9
 to better understand the relationship between CON Law and 
utilization of hospital Inpatient care.  This is because by only using the CON Indicator, we can 
only accurately differentiate between CON states and non-CON states in some cases.  Namely, 
within CON states, there is a large variation in the features of the law and one source of variation 
that we are interested in is the stringency of the law.   Moreover, states with CON Law can act 
similar to those without it by setting very high (in some cases, threshold is listed as “No limit”) 
threshold beyond which hospital expenditures are subject to review.  Similar to the previous 
section, we start our analysis by treating the stringency of CON Law as exogenous in a pooled 
OLS specification as follows:                                                  
                                                          
9
 There could be some concern regarding the possible existence of multicollinearity between CON indicator and this 
measure on its stringency. In order to detect the multicollinearity, we calculate the variance inflation factor 
(VIF=8.93) and tolerance (0.1120). These statistics indicate that multicollinearity is not a serious problem in our 
study. 
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                                                                         (7) 
We then extend our study to control for the existence of unobserved hospital heterogeneity by 
taking advantage the panel setting of our data.  And our model of interest is presented below: 
                                                     ,               (8)              
where    represents time invariant unobserved hospital heterogeneity. This model can be 
estimated either by assuming no correlation between observed explanatory variables and the 
unobserved effect (random effects), or allowing for arbitrary correlation between the unobserved 
effect and the observed explanatory variables (fixed effects). We can then test whether the 
random effects specification or the fixed effect specification is more appropriate based on a 
Hausman type of test, and whether the former is more appropriate than the pooled OLS 
regression using a Breusch-Pagan test. For the reason provided earlier in this section, we use a 
HT model to identify the effects of the time invariant CON Indicator while allowing the 
existence of relationship between the observed factors and the unobserved heterogeneity. We 
then use a Hausman type of test to compare our results of the FE and HT model. 
As noted earlier in this section, it is worth testing whether the CON Strigency should be 
treated as an endogenous variable as well.  In order to tackle this empirical issue and test for the 
endogeneity of the law stringency, we estimate the effect of the CON Law on hospital occupancy 
by using a 2SLS Model as follows
10
: 
Stage one:                                                                      (9) 
Stage two: HospOccit =    +                 ̂ +              +µit                      (10) 
 In this specification, we use the following IVs for stringency: tech index, and GINI index. 
The relationship between techindex and service stringency could go either way.  This is because 
                                                          
10
 In this model, we treat CON Law indicator as exogenous as suggested by our results from the Hausman test 
regarding the endogeneity of CON Law in equation (3) and (4). 
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a state with CON Law that is highly technological innovative and believes CON Law is 
beneficial could adopt a strict process with regard to review of service spending applications to 
ensure that only the most deserving (in terms of public health outcomes) get approved. This in 
turn would help improve the technological innovativeness standing of the state. This is analogous 
to the strict process an Ivy League school follows when reviewing student applications so only 
the best get accepted to sustain and/or improve the reputation of the school. This would support a 
positive relationship between techindex and service stringency. On the other hand, there could 
also be states that are technologically innovative and have a large technology sector that provides 
both jobs and taxes that are not in favor of a strict CON Law if they believe it could hurt business 
interests in the state. A low stringency index (equal to zero) would also capture those states that 
do not have CON Law for similar reasons. This would support a negative relationship between 
techindex and service stringency. As indicated earlier, hospitals in states that have a higher 
proportion of low income patient base get subsidies towards the cost of care and provisions to 
increase such payments for expensive patient cases. Therefore, the governments of such states 
would have valid concerns that hospitals could easily pass on the cost of unnecessary treatment 
to them. This would in turn provide the state an incentive to curb excessive expansion of hospital 
by lowering the threshold or increasing the stringency of the Law as it pertains to service 
expenditures by healthcare providers. This indicates that GINI index is less likely to influence 
the utilization but rather is more likely to impact the CON Law.  Furthermore, we test on the 
endogeneity of CON Stringency in the panel setting first in a RE/FE specification (as below) and 
then in a HT Type of model (since our other key variable-CON Indicator is time invariant). 
 Stage one:                                                                 (11) 
Stage two: HospOccit =    +                  ̂ +       +      +   µit           (12) 
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In the RE model, we treat the CON Stringency as the only endogenous variable. Then we 
relax this assumption by allowing relationships between the covariates (we assume CON 
Stringency as endogenous and CON Indicator to be exogenous in this specification) and the 
unobserved heterogeneity in a HT Type model. We use a Hausman type of test to test the 
endogeneity of CON Indicator in both RE (by comparing it to the RE model where both CON 
Stringency and CON Indicator are treated as exogenous) and Hausman Taylor specifications (by 
comparing it to a HT model where both CON Stringency and CON Indicator are treated as 
exogenous).   
 
IV. Results 
In this paper, we explore the effects of CON Law on Inpatient utilization given one of the 
motivations to implement the CON Law was to regulate the unnecessary healthcare utilization 
and cost. The well documented concerns regarding unnecessary Inpatient utilization trends, 
which could lead to a waste of resources, noted across United States provides a second 
motivation for this analysis.  The main results of our empirical analysis are presented in Tables 
2-5 below, with our preferred specification presented in Table 4.  Our main findings include: 1) 
In general, CON Law (represented by the variable CON Indicator in the result tables) helps 
reduce utilization of Inpatient care
11
. 2). The stringency of the law measured by service 
expenditure thresholds employed by states with CON Law does not have a statistically 
significant impact on the utilization.  3) Durbin-Wu test shows that we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that CON Law and its stringency could be treated as exogenous in estimation.   
                                                          
11
 We also use quantile regression to investigate whether the effects of CON law differ in different states with 
various occupancy rate. The results show the magnitude of effects of CON indicator decreases by 10% with 
increases in occupancy (from 1
st
 to the 3
rd
 quartile), while the magnitude of effects of the stringency of CON 
increases by 90%.  
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 Table 2 below presents the results of estimation on Inpatient utilization only controlling for 
a binary indicator of whether a state has CON Law or not.  We have included results from all the 
four models i.e. cross sectional (OLS), RE and FE panel models and then those from a HT type 
model given the inability of FE to estimate coefficients of time invariant variables. A couple of 
important items to note: 1) Breush Pagan test comparing RE and OLS models indicates existence 
of unobserved heterogeneity of hospital (p-value<0.01). 2) A Hausman type of test comparing 
RE versus FE models indicates that RE is inconsistent or misspecified (p-value <0.01) hence a 
FE model is more appropriate. 3) A Hausman type of test comparing FE with HT model results 
indicates that HT estimates are adequate (p-value>0.1). This can be also noted via a comparison 
of magnitudes and directional nature of coefficients associated with variables that have a 
statistical significant impact on Inpatient utilization in both these models. As mentioned above, 
the motivation for developing an HT type of model is the inability of FE to estimate coefficients 
of time invariant variables, in this case a key variable considered in our study. In short, the 
Hausman Taylor specification is our preferred one in Table 2 based on the test results mentioned 
above. On average CON law will reduce the occupancy rate by 33.61%
12
.  
-----------------------Table 2 about here------------------------------ 
As a next step, we evaluate the endogeneity of CON Indicator
13
. These results are presented in 
Table 3. In the endogenous OLS model, the Durbin-Wu test (with a p-value of 0.8787) shows 
that we cannot reject the hypothesis that CON Indicator could be treated as exogenous
14
. We also 
                                                          
12 We incorporate year dummies to check whether this effect of reduction could be driven by time effects. We do 
not observe any noticeable patterns over time. Further, using a treatment effect model, we find that if all states in US 
had CON law, the national average occupancy rate in our sample will be 57.11%, and if all states in US had no CON 
law, the average is 66.64%, which leads to a difference of 8.53% in occupancy rate of inpatient care. 
 
13
 The results of the first stage estimation are reported in Table A.3. 
 
14
 The first stage F-test yielded a p-value<0.0001.  The over-identification test indicated a p-value=0.8186. In the 
Stock-Yogo test, Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic is 2715.85.   These indicate we have strong and valid IVs. 
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perform an endogeneity test for our RE and HT specifications. A Hausman test for both 
specifications (RE – p-value>0.1 and HT – p-value>0.1) indicates that we are not able to reject 
the hypothesis that CON Indicator could be treated as exogenous.  
-----------------------Table 3 about here------------------------------ 
 
Other findings include the following: 1) Inpatient utilization reduces with increase the 
size of population in a state.  Intuitively, this could mean given constraints on Inpatient care 
resources or resources remaining the same, these states tend to use available capacity more 
judiciously so the population that require inpatient care can still receive it. We confirm this 
rationale via our robustness check featuring Inpatient LOS (Table 6).  If the rationale we mention 
is indeed correct, then a negative relationship is expected between Inpatient LOS and population 
size. 2) We also find that utilization is positively related to proportion of female in state and the 
proportion of Asian-Americans.  As mentioned earlier, this can be explained by the increased 
needs for health services for female population when compared to males (NCHS, 2012). Given 
the economic affluence and stability of Asian population (Census Bureau, 2013), a positive 
relationship exists between the size of this population group and utilization from a hospital 
revenue standpoint is understandable. 3) Similar economics based reasoning explains the 
statistically significant positive relationship noted between GDP and utilization and a negative 
one noted between utilization and proportion of population on Medicare. 4) As noted earlier, 
Emergency Department patients make up a significant proportion of Inpatient population. This 
explains the positive relation noted between population availing ED services in a state and 
Inpatient utilization. 5) As the number of democratic senators in a state increases, it has a 
negative impact on utilization of Inpatient services.  6). An increase in the proportion of patients 
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covered by Medicare is associated with a lower (28.57%) utilization of hospital beds, which can 
partly be explained by the story that the reimbursement of government provided insurance 
(Medicare) may have certain requirement on the efficiency of inpatient care. 
As mentioned earlier, only accounting for the presence or absence of the CON Law can 
be problematic not only because the stringency of the CON Law can vary a lot across states that 
have this legislation in effect, but also because a state with a very relaxed CON Law is 
essentially not very different from a state without the law.  Therefore, it is vital to take into 
account CON Law characteristics in order to better understand the effects of CON Law.  In 
Table 4, we present our estimates of CON Law effects with the stringency of the law taken into 
account.  
-----------------------Table 4 about here------------------------------ 
As in the case of exogenous models (Table 2) considering merely the effect of the indicator 
whether a state has CON Law or not, we have included results from all the four models i.e. cross 
sectional (OLS), RE and FE panel models and then those from a HT type model given the 
inability of FE to estimate coefficients of time invariant variables. A couple of important items to 
note: 1) Breush Pagan test comparing RE and OLS models indicates existence of unobserved 
heterogeneity of hospital (p-value<0.001). 2) A Hausman type of test comparing RE versus FE 
models indicates that RE is inconsistent or misspecified (p-value <0.001) hence a FE model is 
appropriate. 3) A Hausman type of test comparing FE with HT model results indicates that HT 
estimates are adequate (p-value>0.1).  
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As a next step, we evaluate the endogeneity of CON Stringency
15
. These results are 
presented in Table 5. In the endogenous OLS model, the Durbin-Wu test (with a p-value of 
0.2807) shows that we cannot reject the hypothesis that CON Stringency could be treated as 
exogenous
16
. We also perform an endogeneity test for our RE and HT specifications. A Hausman 
test for both specifications (RE – p-value>0.1 and HT – p-value>0.1) indicates that we are not 
able to reject the hypothesis that CON Stringency could be treated as exogenous. In the 
endogenous FE model, the Durbin-Wu test (with a p-value of 0.9987) shows that we cannot 
reject the hypothesis that CON stringency could be treated as exogenous
17
. 
-----------------------Table 5 about here------------------------------ 
In light of our findings that both CON Law and its stringency should be treated as 
exogenous, we next elaborate on results from exogenous specifications included in Table 4, our 
preferred models. All our findings noted earlier in Table 2 hold i.e. 1) CON Law has a 
statistically significant negative impact on Inpatient utilization. 2) Inpatient utilization reduces 
with increase in the size of population in a state.  3) Inpatient utilization is positively related to 
proportion of female in state.  4) A statistically significant positive relationship exists between 
GDP and utilization and a negative one noted between utilization and proportion of population 
on Medicare. 5) A statistically significant positive relationship is noted between population 
availing ED services in a state and Inpatient utilization. 6) As the number of democratic senators 
in a state increases, it has a negative impact on utilization of Inpatient services.   
                                                          
15
 The results of the first stage estimation are reported in Table A.4. 
 
16
 The first stage F-test yielded a p-value<0.0001.  The over-identification test indicated a p-value= 0.9414. In the 
Stock-Yogo test, Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic is 286.53.   These indicate we have strong and valid IVs. 
 
17
 The first stage F-test yielded a p-value<0.0001).  The over-identification test indicated a p-value= 0.9095. In the 
Stock-Yogo test, Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic is 1057.93.   These indicate we have strong and valid IVs. 
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As a robustness check to role of CON Law in reducing utilization given its negative 
correlation with quality of Inpatient care noted in extant literature (Scholle et al. 2005), we 
extend our analysis to study the relationship between CON Law and Inpatient LOS. Specifically, 
we investigate if the same directional nature holds between CON Law and Inpatient LOS, 
another metric that has been found to be negatively associated with quality of Inpatient care 
(Coffman and Rundall, 2005; White and Glazier, 2011). We find that CON Law represented by 
CON Indicator i.e. whether a state has CON Law or not has a negative impact on Inpatient LOS 
i.e. a positive impact on quality of Inpatient care. This provides support to previously 
documented positive relationship noted between CON Law and emergency department quality of 
care (Paul et al, 2014). Further, the statistically significant negative relationship noted between 
Inpatient LOS and population size confirms the rationale we put forth when explaining the 
negative relationship between population size and inpatient utilization in an earlier discussion. 
The results from the Inpatient LOS models are presented in Table 6.
18
 
-----------------------Table 6 about here------------------------------ 
 
V.   Conclusions 
As discussed in the first section of the paper, CON Law was designed to reduce 
healthcare costs. Given that increased Inpatient care utilization and related costs have 
continuously been highlighted as a serious concern in United States, it is worthwhile to study if 
the law is doing what it was originally intended for.  Our results indicate that CON Law has a 
                                                          
18
 Unlike HT model and prior specifications, although the estimated effect of service stringency is statistically 
significant at the 10% level in the RE and OLS models, CON Indicator and service stringency index are tested to be 
jointly significant at the 10% level.  Additionally, our analysis indicated that most states that have CON Law are 
found to have a stringent version of the law. Specifically, less than 40% of the states have a stringency index value 
less than 0.5, and more than 60% of the states have this index value higher than 0.75 (which indicates a strict law).  
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negative impact on Inpatient care utilization.  Besides, we do not find sufficient statistical 
evidence to reject the exogenous assumption of CON and its features. Furthermore, we confirm 
the qualitative nature of these key findings by an analysis featuring Inpatient LOS.  
The other key findings include the following: 1) Inpatient utilization reduces with 
increase in the size of population in a state.  2) Inpatient utilization is positively related to 
proportion of female in state and the proportion of Asian-Americans.  3) A statistically 
significant positive relationship exists between GDP and utilization and a negative one noted 
between utilization and proportion of population on Medicare. 4) A statistically significant 
positive relationship is noted between population availing ED services in a state and Inpatient 
utilization. 5) As the number of democratic senators in a state increases, it has a negative impact 
on utilization of Inpatient services.   
In summary, our results indicate that CON Law can help mitigate the increased Inpatient 
care utilization issues.  Our findings have significant policy implications with regard to CON 
Law’s impact on healthcare. The implication of our results can aid public policy makers when 
deciding the appropriate health programs or legislative framework to control unnecessary use of 
health services and resulting costs. 
VI.  
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Table 1: Summary statistics for variables 
 
 
sample 
Hospitals in states 
without CON 
Hospitals in states 
with CON 
 
(n=22639) (n=8474) (n= 14165) 
 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Inpatient Utilization 0.595 (0.249) 0.577 (0.306) 0.606 (0.206) 
CON Law 
      CON Indicator 0.626 (0.484) 0.000 (0.000) 1.000 (0.000) 
Stringency Index – Service 0.164 (0.331) 0.000 (0.000) 0.261 (0.387) 
Hospital Characteristics 
      Full Time Physicians and Dentists 16.269 (66.010) 13.036 (54.464) 18.204 (71.971) 
Full Time Nurses 163.366 (262.751) 147.706 (241.313) 172.734 (274.359) 
Member of Council of Teaching  0.063 (0.242) 0.045 (0.208) 0.073 (0.260) 
Resident Training Approval 0.180 (0.384) 0.147 (0.354) 0.199 (0.400) 
JCAHO Accreditation 0.732 (0.443) 0.674 (0.469) 0.766 (0.423) 
Not For Profit 0.523 (0.500) 0.479 (0.500) 0.549 (0.498) 
Government Ownership 0.036 (0.186) 0.037 (0.189) 0.035 (0.185) 
Demographics 
      Population Size 11.179 (9.653) 16.423 (12.596) 8.043 (5.267) 
Proportion - Female 0.508 (0.006) 0.503 (0.005) 0.510 (0.004) 
Proportion (age 0-17) 0.250 (0.017) 0.261 (0.019) 0.243 (0.012) 
Proportion (18-44) 0.379 (0.016) 0.386 (0.018) 0.376 (0.014) 
Proportion (45-64) 0.245 (0.017) 0.236 (0.018) 0.251 (0.014) 
Proportion - Black 0.127 (0.088) 0.076 (0.036) 0.158 (0.096) 
Proportion - Asian 0.034 (0.030) 0.044 (0.040) 0.028 (0.019) 
Proportion - Amer Indian 0.010 (0.014) 0.016 (0.021) 0.006 (0.004) 
Proportion - Pacific 0.001 (0.001) 0.002 (0.002) 0.001 (0.001) 
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Proportion - Oth Race 0.014 (0.005) 0.016 (0.005) 0.013 (0.004) 
Illegal Immigrant 0.512 (0.717) 0.959 (0.969) 0.244 (0.264) 
Health Status       
Obesity  24.843 (3.517) 24.261 (3.533) 25.191 (3.462) 
Proportion - Smoke Daily 15.362 (3.477) 13.654 (3.280) 16.384 (3.178) 
Proportion - Drink Heavily 5.170 (1.077) 5.235 (0.968) 5.131 (1.135) 
Child Death Rate 2.045 (0.487) 1.977 (0.363) 2.087 (0.545) 
Health Care Access and Supply       
Proportion - Emp Ins 0.535 (0.053) 0.522 (0.050) 0.543 (0.054) 
Proportion - Priv Ins  0.090 (0.022) 0.096 (0.026) 0.087 (0.019) 
Proportion - Medicaid 0.117 (0.030) 0.116 (0.029) 0.117 (0.030) 
Proportion - Medicare 0.124 (0.018) 0.114 (0.016) 0.129 (0.016) 
State ED Market 4.360 (3.175) 5.799 (3.967) 3.499 (2.172) 
Number of Teaching Hospitals 16.876    (14.405) 20.142     (13.419) 15.083     (14.611) 
Political and economic environment 
      Senator Mean 0.529 (0.365) 0.436 (0.374) 0.585 (0.347) 
Senator Deviation 0.223 (0.272) 0.198 (0.232) 0.238 (0.292) 
Number of Democratic Senators 1.038 (0.870) 0.792 (0.900) 1.185 (0.817) 
Gov_demo 0.423 (0.494) 0.279 (0.449) 0.509 (0.500) 
Gov_ind 0.008 (0.091) 0.017 (0.130) 0.003 (0.054) 
Median Income 41.693 (6.400) 42.607 (5.607) 41.147 (6.772) 
Proportion - Inpatient Days - 
Medicare 0.449 (0.240) 0.447 (0.249) 0.451 (0.234) 
Proportion - Inpatient Days - 
Medicaid 0.179 (0.178) 0.175 (0.176) 0.182 (0.179) 
Unemployment Rate 0.062 (0.020) 0.061 (0.018) 0.062 (0.021) 
GDP 0.395 (0.369) 0.591 (0.483) 0.278 (0.202) 
Instrumental Variables 
      GINI 228.250 (75.837) 224.834 (77.172) 230.294 (74.955) 
Tech Index 55.469 (13.638) 61.840 (10.844) 51.657 (13.715) 
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Table 2: Effect of CON Indicator on Inpatient utilization 
  CON Law as Exogenous 
  Cross Sectional Random Effect Fixed Effect Hausman Taylor 
Variables Coef. 
Std. 
Error 
Test 
Stat 
Coef. 
Std. 
Error 
Test 
Stat 
Coef. 
Std. 
Error 
Test 
Stat 
Coef. 
Std. 
Error 
Test 
Stat 
CON Indicator 
-
0.027 (0.005) -5.07*** -0.023 (0.007) -3.12*** 0 (omitted) 
 
-0.200 (0.092) -2.18** 
Full Time Physicians and 
Dentists 
-
0.00004 
(0.000
03) -1.44 
-
0.00002 (0.00003) -0.78 0.00001 (0.00005) 0.13 0.00005 (0.00004) 1.14 
Full Time Nurses 
0.000
1 
(0.000
01) 17.36*** 0.0001 (0.00001) 12.38*** 0.00002 (0.00002) 0.91 0.00003 (0.00002) 1.82 
Member of Council of 
Teaching  
-
0.0004 (0.008) -0.05 0.013 (0.010) 1.27 0.002 (0.022) 0.10 0.020 (0.020) 1.02 
Resident Training 
Approval 0.018 (0.005) 3.67*** 0.022 (0.006) 3.71*** -0.003 (0.010) -0.33 0.002 (0.009) 0.24 
JCAHO Accreditation 0.089 (0.004) 24.40*** 0.058 (0.004) 13.37*** -0.011 (0.007) -1.61 -0.010 (0.006) -1.56 
Not For Profit 
-
0.004 (0.003) -1.13 -0.002 (0.004) -0.38 0.009 (0.011) 0.87 0.012 (0.010) 1.19 
Government Ownership 
-
0.184 (0.009) 
-
19.46*** -0.164 (0.013) 
-
12.52*** -0.108 (0.068) -1.59 -0.012 (0.057) -0.21 
Population Size 
-
0.007 (0.003) -2.13** -0.008 (0.003) -2.45** -0.029 (0.008) -3.75*** -0.034 (0.007) -4.61*** 
Proportion - Female 2.036 (0.764) 2.67*** 2.754 (0.958) 2.87*** 14.621 (4.848) 3.02*** 16.720 (4.570) 3.66*** 
Proportion (age 0-17) 
-
2.365 (0.350) -6.77*** -2.310 (0.394) -5.86*** -1.825 (1.411) -1.29 -1.322 (1.335) -0.99 
Proportion (18-44) 
-
1.039 (0.308) -3.37*** -0.443 (0.346) -1.28 1.445 (1.429) 1.01 1.668 (1.360) 1.23 
Proportion (45-64) 
-
0.681 (0.393) -1.73* -0.249 (0.445) -0.56 0.789 (1.511) 0.52 1.025 (1.438) 0.71 
Proportion - Black 0.206 (0.039) 5.22*** 0.176 (0.049) 3.58*** 1.110 (0.780) 1.42 0.391 (0.707) 0.55 
Proportion - Asian 0.032 (0.298) 0.11 0.462 (0.334) 1.38 2.621 (1.721) 1.52 3.233 (1.629) 1.99** 
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Proportion - Amer Indian 
-
0.164 (0.151) -1.09 -0.056 (0.211) -0.26 -6.904 (4.511) -1.53 -4.387 (4.223) -1.04 
Proportion - Pacific 4.803 (2.630) 1.83* 7.145 (3.460) 2.07** 53.572 (45.069) 1.19 53.390 (42.940) 1.24 
Proportion - Oth Race 
-
0.206 (0.522) -0.39 -0.745 (0.715) -1.04 0.245 (6.953) 0.04 2.929 (6.569) 0.45 
Proportion - Emp Ins 
-
0.145 (0.110) -1.33 -0.119 (0.108) -1.10 -0.216 (0.155) -1.39 -0.193 (0.148) -1.31 
Proportion - Priv Ins  
-
0.714 (0.122) -5.83*** -0.518 (0.129) -4.02*** -0.333 (0.214) -1.56 -0.325 (0.204) -1.59 
Proportion - Medicaid 
-
0.313 (0.131) -2.39** -0.215 (0.127) -1.70* -0.102 (0.179) -0.57 -0.049 (0.170) -0.29 
Proportion - Medicare 
-
0.358 (0.258) -1.39 -0.315 (0.224) -1.41 -0.427 (0.252) -1.69* -0.405 (0.240) -1.68* 
Obesity  
-
0.0003 (0.001) -0.39 -0.001 (0.001) -0.84 0.000 (0.001) 0.17 0.0001 (0.001) 0.16 
Proportion - Smoke Daily 0.001 (0.001) 1.48 0.0005 (0.001) 0.49 0.000 (0.002) 0.11 0.0004 (0.002) 0.26 
Proportion - Drink 
Heavily 0.002 (0.002) 1.25 0.002 (0.002) 0.88 0.000 (0.002) 0.10 -0.0003 (0.002) -0.13 
Child Death Rate 
-
0.009 (0.005) -1.74* 0.001 (0.0005) 2.47** 0.002 (0.005) 0.42 0.003 (0.005) 0.64 
Number of Teaching 
Hospitals 0.002 
(0.000
4) 3.91*** -0.001 (0.004) -0.29 0 (omitted) 
 
0.001 (0.003) 0.42 
Illegal Immigrant 0.069 (0.021) 3.27*** 0.056 (0.020) 2.75*** 0.013 (0.034) 0.38 0.003 (0.032) 0.11 
State ED Market 
-
0.012 (0.006) -2.08** -0.002 (0.006) -0.29 0.019 (0.010) 1.97** 0.021 (0.009) 2.23** 
Senator Mean 0.037 (0.017) 2.12** 0.036 (0.016) 2.25** 0.028 (0.019) 1.48 0.027 (0.018) 1.46 
Senator Deviation 
-
0.007 (0.006) -1.09 -0.004 (0.006) -0.70 0.007 (0.007) 0.97 0.007 (0.007) 1.13 
Number of Democratic 
Senators 
-
0.014 (0.006) -2.12** -0.014 (0.006) -2.24** -0.017 (0.007) -2.30** -0.016 (0.007) -2.36** 
Gov_demo 
-
0.003 (0.004) -0.95 -0.007 (0.003) -2.10** -0.005 (0.004) -1.36 -0.006 (0.004) -1.45 
Gov_ind - (0.017) -0.77 -0.006 (0.015) -0.38 0.020 (0.016) 1.24 0.018 (0.016) 1.16 
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0.013 
Median Income 
0.003 (0.001) 4.01*** -0.256 (0.009) 
-
28.14*** 0.001 (0.001) 1.29 0.002 (0.001) 1.46 
Proportion - Inpatient 
Days - Medicare 
-
0.307 (0.008) 
-
39.69*** 0.037 (0.011) 3.35*** -0.166 (0.014) 
-
12.15*** -0.167 (0.013) 
-
12.78*** 
Proportion - Inpatient 
Days - Medicaid 0.047 (0.010) 4.72*** 0.003 (0.001) 3.52*** 0.009 (0.014) 0.62 0.009 (0.014) 0.64 
Unemployment Rate 
-
0.159 (0.120) -1.32 -0.284 (0.105) -2.70*** -0.260 (0.164) -1.58 -0.241 (0.157) -1.54 
GDP 0.163 (0.081) 2.02** 0.116 (0.071) 1.63 0.288 (0.098) 2.93*** 0.296 (0.094) 3.17*** 
Constant 0.856 (0.525) 1.63 0.115 (0.640) 0.18 -6.984 (3.258) -2.14 -8.202 (3.049) -2.69 
N 22963     22963     22963     22963     
*
 indicates statistical significance at the 10% level 
**
 indicates statistical significance at the 5% level 
***
 indicates statistical significance at the 1% level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Effect of CON Indicator on Inpatient utilization 
  CON Law as Endogenous 
  Cross Sectional Random Effect Hausman Taylor 
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Variables Coef. 
Std. 
Error 
Test 
Stat 
Coef. 
Std. 
Error 
Test 
Stat 
Coef. 
Std. 
Error 
Test 
Stat 
CON Indicator -0.025 (0.012) -2.08** -0.038 (0.022) -1.78* 0.531 (0.323) 1.64 
Full Time Physicians and Dentists 
-
0.00004 (0.00003) -1.44 
-
0.00002 (0.00003) -0.78 0.00001 (0.00004) 0.13 
Full Time Nurses 0.0001 (0.00001) 17.37*** 0.0001 (0.00001) 12.40*** 0.00002 (0.00002) 0.94 
Member of Council of Teaching  -0.0004 (0.008) -0.05 0.013 (0.010) 1.26 0.002 (0.021) 0.10 
Resident Training Approval 0.018 (0.005) 3.67*** 0.022 (0.006) 3.72*** -0.003 (0.010) -0.34 
JCAHO Accreditation 0.089 (0.004) 24.36*** 0.059 (0.004) 13.47*** -0.011 (0.007) -1.66* 
Not For Profit -0.004 (0.003) -1.15 -0.001 (0.004) -0.28 0.009 (0.010) 0.89 
Government Ownership 
-0.184 (0.009) 
-
19.48*** -0.164 (0.013) 
-
12.56*** -0.108 (0.066) -1.64 
Population Size -0.007 (0.004) -1.85* -0.009 (0.004) -2.51** -0.029 (0.008) -3.85*** 
Proportion - Female 2.015 (0.775) 2.60*** 2.981 (1.006) 2.96*** 14.621 (4.714) 3.10*** 
Proportion (age 0-17) -2.345 (0.373) -6.29*** -2.465 (0.445) -5.54*** -1.825 (1.372) -1.33 
Proportion (18-44) -1.032 (0.311) -3.32*** -0.473 (0.347) -1.36 1.445 (1.390) 1.04 
Proportion (45-64) -0.665 (0.406) -1.64 -0.346 (0.462) -0.75 0.789 (1.470) 0.54 
Proportion - Black 0.203 (0.044) 4.56*** 0.202 (0.060) 3.37*** 1.110 (0.758) 1.46 
Proportion - Asian 0.033 (0.298) 0.11 0.472 (0.334) 1.41 2.621 (1.674) 1.57 
Proportion - Amer Indian -0.153 (0.168) -0.91 -0.159 (0.251) -0.64 -6.904 (4.387) -1.57 
Proportion - Pacific 4.774 (2.635) 1.81* 7.363 (3.464) 2.13** 53.572 (43.832) 1.22 
Proportion - Oth Race -0.256 (0.617) -0.42 -0.323 (0.903) -0.36 0.245 (6.762) 0.04 
Proportion - Emp Ins -0.149 (0.112) -1.33 -0.107 (0.109) -0.98 -0.216 (0.151) -1.43 
Proportion - Priv Ins  -0.709 (0.126) -5.61*** -0.564 (0.142) -3.98*** -0.333 (0.208) -1.60 
Proportion - Medicaid -0.317 (0.134) -2.37*** -0.206 (0.127) -1.62 -0.102 (0.174) -0.58 
Proportion - Medicare -0.356 (0.258) -1.38 -0.318 (0.224) -1.42 -0.427 (0.245) -1.74* 
Obesity  0.000 (0.001) -0.38 -0.001 (0.001) -0.90 0.0001 (0.001) 0.18 
Proportion - Smoke Daily 0.001 (0.001) 1.38 0.001 (0.001) 0.71 0.0002 (0.002) 0.11 
Proportion - Drink Heavily 0.002 (0.002) 1.20 0.002 (0.002) 1.01 0.0002 (0.002) 0.11 
Child Death Rate -0.009 (0.005) -1.72* -0.001 (0.004) -0.33 0.002 (0.005) 0.43 
Number of Teaching Hospitals 0.002 (0.0004) 3.91*** 0.001 (0.0005) 2.31** 0.003 (0.003) 1.03 
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Illegal Immigrant 0.068 (0.022) 3.11*** 0.059 (0.021) 2.85*** 0.013 (0.033) 0.39 
State ED Market -0.012 (0.006) -2.01** 0.000 (0.006) -0.02 0.019 (0.010) 2.02** 
Senator Mean 0.037 (0.017) 2.12** 0.037 (0.016) 2.30** 0.028 (0.019) 1.52 
Senator Deviation -0.007 (0.006) -1.10 -0.003 (0.006) -0.56 0.007 (0.007) 1.00 
Number of Democratic Senators -0.014 (0.007) -2.12** -0.013 (0.006) -2.07** -0.017 (0.007) -2.36** 
Gov_demo -0.003 (0.004) -0.95 -0.007 (0.003) -2.17** -0.005 (0.004) -1.40 
Gov_ind -0.013 (0.018) -0.73 -0.008 (0.015) -0.53 0.020 (0.016) 1.27 
Median Income 0.003 (0.001) 3.99*** 0.003 (0.001) 3.32*** 0.001 (0.001) 1.32 
Proportion - Inpatient Days - 
Medicare -0.307 (0.008) 
-
39.72*** -0.256 (0.009) 
-
28.22*** -0.166 (0.013) 
-
12.50*** 
Proportion - Inpatient Days - 
Medicaid 0.047 (0.010) 4.72*** 0.037 (0.011) 3.38*** 0.009 (0.014) 0.63 
Unemployment Rate -0.158 (0.121) -1.31 -0.296 (0.107) -2.78*** -0.260 (0.160) -1.62 
GDP 0.161 (0.081) 1.98** 0.125 (0.072) 1.73* 0.288 (0.096) 3.01*** 
Constant 0.856 (0.524) 1.63 0.075 (0.642) 0.12 -7.378 (3.127) -2.36** 
N 22963     22963     22963     
*
 indicates statistical significance at the 10% level 
**
 indicates statistical significance at the 5% level 
***
 indicates statistical significance at the 1% level 
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Table 4: Effects of CON Indicator and its stringency on Inpatient utilization 
  CON Law and Stringency as Exogenous 
  Cross Sectional Random Effect Fixed Effect Hausman Taylor 
Variables Coef. 
Std. 
Error 
Test 
Stat 
Coef. 
Std. 
Error 
Test 
Stat 
Coef. 
Std. 
Error 
Test 
Stat 
Coef. 
Std. 
Error 
Test 
Stat 
CON Indicator -0.028 (0.006) -4.55*** -0.025 (0.008) -3.09*** 0 (omitted) 
 
-0.218 (0.097) -2.25** 
CON Stringency - Service -0.003 (0.005) -0.52 -0.001 (0.005) -0.25 0.001 (0.008) 0.09 -0.002 (0.008) -0.31 
Full Time Physicians and 
Dentists 
-
0.00004 (0.00003) -1.34 
-
0.00003 (0.00003) -0.89 
-
0.00001 (0.0001) -0.23 
-
0.00001 (0.00005) -0.25 
Full Time Nurses 0.0001 (0.00001) 17.07*** 0.0001 (0.00001) 12.22*** 0.00002 (0.00002) 0.86 0.00002 (0.00002) 0.84 
Member of Council of 
Teaching  0.0002 (0.008) 0.02 0.013 (0.011) 1.23 0.003 (0.022) 0.13 0.003 (0.022) 0.12 
Resident Training 
Approval 0.013 (0.005) 2.66*** 0.019 (0.006) 3.05*** -0.002 (0.010) -0.17 -0.002 (0.010) -0.18 
JCAHO Accreditation 0.088 (0.004) 23.41*** 0.058 (0.004) 13.01*** -0.011 (0.007) -1.52 -0.011 (0.007) -1.54 
Not For Profit -0.004 (0.003) -1.11 -0.002 (0.005) -0.39 0.009 (0.012) 0.80 0.009 (0.011) 0.79 
Government Ownership 
-0.181 (0.010) 
-
18.52*** -0.163 (0.014) 
-
12.04*** -0.112 (0.089) -1.26 -0.115 (0.088) -1.31 
Population Size -0.007 (0.003) -1.89* -0.008 (0.003) -2.38** -0.030 (0.008) -3.70*** -0.026 (0.008) -3.49*** 
Proportion - Female 1.331 (0.789) 1.69* 1.965 (0.995) 1.98** 14.455 (5.159) 2.80*** 12.100 (4.806) 2.52** 
Proportion (age 0-17) -2.176 (0.366) -5.94*** -2.280 (0.403) -5.66*** -1.856 (1.438) -1.29 -1.894 (1.421) -1.33 
Proportion (18-44) -0.760 (0.321) -2.37** -0.405 (0.355) -1.14 1.445 (1.550) 0.93 1.033 (1.503) 0.69 
Proportion (45-64) -0.192 (0.425) -0.45 -0.002 (0.464) 0.00 0.785 (1.553) 0.51 0.757 (1.534) 0.49 
Proportion - Black 0.195 (0.040) 4.86*** 0.178 (0.050) 3.59*** 1.064 (0.797) 1.33 0.622 (0.720) 0.86 
Proportion - Asian 0.576 (0.329) 1.75* 0.844 (0.360) 2.34** 2.488 (1.769) 1.41 1.112 (1.439) 0.77 
Proportion - Amer Indian -0.258 (0.154) -1.68* -0.160 (0.214) -0.75 -7.081 (4.612) -1.54 -9.887 (4.082) -2.42** 
Proportion - Pacific 9.619 (2.892) 3.33*** 12.696 (3.868) 3.28*** 57.748 (51.183) 1.13 84.054 (46.877) 1.79* 
Proportion - Oth Race -3.720 (0.949) -3.92*** -4.189 (1.260) -3.32*** 0.289 (8.353) 0.03 -3.339 (7.828) -0.43 
Proportion - Emp Ins -0.162 (0.111) -1.46 -0.128 (0.111) -1.15 -0.178 (0.169) -1.05 -0.123 (0.162) -0.76 
Proportion - Priv Ins  -0.606 (0.135) -4.51*** -0.479 (0.137) -3.50*** -0.286 (0.229) -1.25 -0.239 (0.223) -1.07 
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Proportion - Medicaid -0.260 (0.138) -1.88* -0.185 (0.135) -1.37 -0.016 (0.200) -0.08 0.005 (0.197) 0.02 
Proportion - Medicare -0.227 (0.267) -0.85 -0.282 (0.232) -1.22 -0.452 (0.267) -1.70* -0.423 (0.263) -1.61 
Obesity  -0.001 (0.001) -0.92 -0.001 (0.001) -1.04 0.0001 (0.001) 0.17 0.0001 (0.001) 0.14 
Proportion - Smoke Daily 0.001 (0.001) 1.36 0.001 (0.001) 0.66 0.001 (0.002) 0.28 0.001 (0.002) 0.36 
Proportion - Drink 
Heavily 0.002 (0.002) 1.07 0.001 (0.002) 0.74 
-
0.00001 (0.002) -0.01 0.0003 (0.002) 0.12 
Child Death Rate -0.008 (0.005) -1.54 -0.002 (0.005) -0.38 0.002 (0.005) 0.37 0.001 (0.005) 0.30 
Number of Teaching 
Hospitals 0.001 (0.0004) 3.40*** 0.001 (0.0005) 2.17** 0 (omitted) 
 
-0.0001 (0.003) -0.05 
Illegal Immigrant 0.060 (0.022) 2.76*** -0.0001 (0.006) -0.03 0.014 (0.035) 0.40 0.030 (0.032) 0.95 
State ED Market -0.008 (0.006) -1.31 0.049 (0.021) 2.30** 0.019 (0.010) 1.92* 0.020 (0.010) 2.02** 
Senator Mean 0.043 (0.018) 2.41** 0.040 (0.017) 2.43** 0.028 (0.020) 1.39 0.032 (0.019) 1.65* 
Senator Deviation -0.008 (0.006) -1.24 -0.005 (0.006) -0.77 0.007 (0.007) 1.02 0.006 (0.007) 0.87 
Number of Democratic 
Senators -0.015 (0.007) -2.22** -0.015 (0.006) -2.32** -0.017 (0.008) -2.24** -0.017 (0.007) -2.32** 
Gov_demo -0.006 (0.004) -1.49 -0.008 (0.003) -2.51** -0.006 (0.004) -1.51 -0.007 (0.004) -1.77* 
Gov_ind -0.020 (0.018) -1.12 -0.008 (0.015) -0.51 0.021 (0.017) 1.23 0.019 (0.016) 1.17 
Median Income 0.003 (0.001) 3.93*** 0.003 (0.001) 3.58*** 0.001 (0.001) 1.23 0.001 (0.001) 0.98 
Proportion - Inpatient 
Days - Medicare -0.305 (0.008) 
-
38.07*** -0.258 (0.009) 
-
27.37*** -0.173 (0.014) 
-
11.98*** -0.173 (0.014) 
-
12.12*** 
Proportion - Inpatient 
Days - Medicaid 0.049 (0.010) 4.88*** 0.039 (0.011) 3.46*** 0.010 (0.015) 0.70 0.010 (0.015) 0.69 
Unemployment Rate -0.152 (0.124) -1.23 -0.263 (0.109) -2.43** -0.240 (0.171) -1.40 -0.261 (0.168) -1.55 
GDP 0.104 (0.083) 1.26 0.100 (0.073) 1.38 0.290 (0.101) 2.86*** 0.259 (0.098) 2.65*** 
Constant 0.957 (0.533) 1.79 0.458 (0.655) 0.70 -6.921 (3.446) -2.01 -5.330 (3.214) -1.66 
N 21764     21764     21764     21764     
*
 indicates statistical significance at the 10% level 
**
 indicates statistical significance at the 5% level 
***
 indicates statistical significance at the 1% level 
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Table 5: Effects of CON Indicator and its stringency on Inpatient utilization 
  CON Stringency as Endogenous 
  Cross Sectional Random Effect Fixed Effect Hausman Taylor 
Variables Coef. 
Std. 
Error 
Test 
Stat 
Coef. 
Std. 
Error 
Test 
Stat 
Coef. 
Std. 
Error 
Test 
Stat 
Coef. 
Std. 
Error 
Test 
Stat 
CON Indicator 
-0.016 (0.012) -1.34 -0.015 (0.013) -1.19 
   
-0.210 (0.098) 
-
2.14** 
CON Stringency 
- Service -0.044 (0.036) -1.22 -0.030 (0.029) -1.05 -0.003 (0.033) -0.10 -0.001 (0.008) -0.08 
Full Time 
Physicians and 
Dentists 
-
0.000
04 
(0.0000
3) -1.35 
-
0.000
03 
(0.0000
3) -0.91 
-
0.000
01 
(0.0001
) -0.23 
0.000
03 
(0.0000
5) 0.69 
Full Time 
Nurses 
0.000
1 
(0.0000
1) 
16.83*
** 
0.000
1 
(0.0000
1) 
12.15*
** 
0.000
02 
(0.0000
2) 0.87 
0.000
03 
(0.0000
2) 1.63 
Member of 
Council of 
Teaching  0.001 (0.008) 0.16 0.014 (0.011) 1.28 0.003 (0.022) 0.13 0.018 (0.021) 0.89 
Resident 
Training 
Approval 0.013 (0.005) 
2.64**
* 0.019 (0.006) 
3.05**
* -0.002 (0.010) -0.18 0.003 (0.010) 0.32 
JCAHO 
Accreditation 0.088 (0.004) 
23.42*
** 0.059 (0.004) 
13.08*
** -0.011 (0.007) -1.52 -0.010 (0.007) -1.48 
Not For Profit -0.003 (0.003) -0.98 -0.002 (0.005) -0.38 0.009 (0.012) 0.80 0.012 (0.011) 1.07 
Government -0.182 (0.010) - -0.164 (0.014) - -0.112 (0.089) -1.26 0.021 (0.072) 0.30 
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Ownership 18.57*
** 
12.10*
** 
Population Size 
-0.008 (0.004) 
-
2.23** -0.007 (0.003) 
-
2.23** -0.029 (0.009) 
-
3.42**
* -0.034 (0.008) 
-
4.55**
* 
Proportion - 
Female 0.439 (1.063) 0.41 1.383 (1.130) 1.22 
14.56
8 (5.349) 
2.72**
* 
17.05
0 (4.888) 
3.49**
* 
Proportion (age 
0-17) 
-1.706 (0.507) 
-
3.36**
* -2.161 (0.414) 
-
5.22**
* -1.829 (1.472) -1.24 -1.496 (1.380) -1.08 
Proportion (18-
44) -0.725 (0.322) 
-
2.25** -0.416 (0.355) -1.17 1.535 (1.943) 0.79 1.723 (1.490) 1.16 
Proportion (45-
64) 0.272 (0.545) 0.50 0.173 (0.487) 0.36 0.867 (1.854) 0.47 0.891 (1.496) 0.60 
Proportion - 
Black 0.186 (0.041) 
4.58**
* 0.176 (0.050) 
3.54**
* 1.092 (0.874) 1.25 0.398 (0.733) 0.54 
Proportion - 
Asian 1.000 (0.471) 2.12** 0.946 (0.374) 2.53** 2.464 (1.794) 1.37 3.173 (1.688) 1.88* 
Proportion - 
Amer Indian -0.185 (0.164) -1.13 -0.120 (0.217) -0.56 -7.181 (4.757) -1.51 -3.900 (4.305) -0.91 
Proportion - 
Pacific 
11.74
1 (3.281) 
3.58**
* 
14.05
6 (4.037) 
3.48**
* 
57.73
1 
(51.122
) 1.13 
45.81
7 
(49.132
) 0.93 
Proportion - Oth 
Race 
-4.831 (1.285) 
-
3.76**
* -4.799 (1.377) 
-
3.49**
* 0.272 (8.336) 0.03 4.941 (7.885) 0.63 
Proportion - 
Emp Ins -0.151 (0.112) -1.36 -0.179 (0.120) -1.49 -0.187 (0.209) -0.89 -0.153 (0.162) -0.95 
Proportion - Priv 
Ins  
-0.441 (0.179) 
-
2.47** -0.433 (0.141) 
-
3.07**
* -0.290 (0.231) -1.26 -0.285 (0.220) -1.29 
Proportion - 
Medicaid -0.218 (0.142) -1.54 -0.215 (0.137) -1.56 -0.025 (0.236) -0.11 0.036 (0.192) 0.19 
Proportion - 0.003 (0.322) 0.01 -0.239 (0.236) -1.01 -0.456 (0.273) -1.67* -0.445 (0.257) -1.73* 
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Medicare 
Obesity  
-0.001 (0.001) -1.43 -0.001 (0.001) -1.24 
0.000
2 (0.001) 0.18 
0.000
1 (0.001) 0.12 
Proportion - 
Smoke Daily 0.003 (0.002) 1.88* 0.001 (0.001) 1.19 0.001 (0.002) 0.29 0.001 (0.002) 0.42 
Proportion - 
Drink Heavily 
0.004 (0.003) 1.72* 0.002 (0.002) 1.05 
-
0.000
02 (0.002) -0.01 -0.001 (0.002) -0.25 
Child Death Rate -0.007 (0.005) -1.29 -0.001 (0.005) -0.17 0.002 (0.005) 0.36 0.002 (0.005) 0.50 
Number of 
Teaching 
Hospitals 0.001 (0.001) 1.01 0.001 (0.001) 1.25 
   
0.002 (0.003) 0.72 
Illegal 
Immigrant 0.037 (0.029) 1.29 0.031 (0.026) 1.18 0.013 (0.036) 0.37 0.004 (0.033) 0.11 
State ED Market 0.002 (0.010) 0.22 0.002 (0.006) 0.33 0.019 (0.010) 1.92* 0.021 (0.010) 2.21** 
Senator Mean 0.034 (0.019) 1.79* 0.040 (0.017) 2.42** 0.028 (0.020) 1.39 0.025 (0.019) 1.30 
Senator 
Deviation -0.009 (0.007) -1.45 -0.005 (0.006) -0.89 0.007 (0.007) 0.97 0.008 (0.007) 1.20 
Number of 
Democratic 
Senators -0.011 (0.007) -1.58 -0.015 (0.006) 
-
2.42** -0.017 (0.008) 
-
2.21** -0.016 (0.007) 
-
2.23** 
Gov_demo 
-0.012 (0.006) -1.93* -0.010 (0.004) 
-
2.72**
* -0.006 (0.004) -1.51 -0.007 (0.004) -1.62 
Gov_ind -0.025 (0.018) -1.38 -0.009 (0.015) -0.60 0.021 (0.017) 1.24 0.018 (0.016) 1.11 
Median Income 
0.003 (0.001) 
3.73**
* 0.003 (0.001) 
3.75**
* 0.001 (0.001) 1.17 0.001 (0.001) 1.32 
Proportion - 
Inpatient Days - 
Medicare -0.307 (0.008) 
-
37.82*
** -0.259 (0.009) 
-
27.44*
** -0.173 (0.014) 
-
11.99*
** -0.173 (0.014) 
-
12.45*
** 
Proportion - 
Inpatient Days - 
Medicaid 0.048 (0.010) 
4.75**
* 0.039 (0.011) 
3.43**
* 0.010 (0.015) 0.70 0.010 (0.014) 0.72 
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Unemployment 
Rate 
-0.278 (0.158) -1.75* -0.291 (0.112) 
-
2.60**
* -0.234 (0.183) -1.28 -0.230 (0.165) -1.40 
GDP 
0.111 (0.083) 1.34 0.110 (0.073) 1.50 0.292 (0.104) 
2.82**
* 0.300 (0.098) 
3.07**
* 
Constant 1.095 (0.547) 2.00 0.686 (0.689) 1.00 
   
-8.370 (3.243) -2.58 
N 21764     21764     21764     21764     
*
 indicates statistical significance at the 10% level 
**
 indicates statistical significance at the 5% level 
***
 indicates statistical significance at the 1% level 
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Table 6: Effects of CON Indicator and its stringency on Inpatient LOS 
 CON Law and Stringency as exogenous 
 
Cross Sectional Random Effect Hausman Taylor 
Variables Coef. 
Std. 
Error 
Test 
Stat 
Coef. 
Std. 
Error 
Test Stat Coef. Std. Error 
Test 
Stat 
CON Indicator -0.598 (2.484) -0.24 -0.647 (2.563) -0.25 -352.174 (198.490) -1.77* 
CON Stringency - Service -4.430 (2.227) -1.99** -3.741 (2.265) -1.65* 5.040 (8.606) 0.59 
Full Time Physicians and 
Dentists 0.019 (0.019) 1.01 0.019 (0.019) 0.97 0.014 (0.063) 0.22 
Full Time Nurses -0.003 (0.004) -0.72 -0.003 (0.004) -0.71 -0.008 (0.024) -0.33 
Member of Council of 
Teaching  -5.132 (3.740) -1.37 -4.812 (3.860) -1.25 3.488 (22.129) 0.16 
Resident Training Approval -1.014 (2.203) -0.46 -0.988 (2.275) -0.43 2.195 (11.155) 0.20 
JCAHO Accreditation 2.821 (1.815) 1.55 2.903 (1.863) 1.56 7.642 (7.224) 1.06 
Not For Profit -4.533 (1.563) -2.90*** -4.503 (1.628) -2.77*** 1.136 (11.916) 0.10 
Government Ownership -28.673 (4.414) -6.50*** -26.962 (4.553) -5.92*** 8538.173 (14745.080) 0.58 
Population Size 2.560 (1.151) 2.22** 2.190 (1.144) 1.91* 7.341 (5.880) 1.25 
Proportion - Female 1643.176 (358.770) 4.58*** 1512.419 (367.788) 4.11*** -2042.432 (3680.587) -0.55 
Proportion (age 0-17) 4.879 (157.175) 0.03 14.404 (159.233) 0.09 -2307.086 (969.887) -2.38** 
Proportion (18-44) -29.959 (137.803) -0.22 -29.335 (140.330) -0.21 1184.213 (1179.199) 1.00 
Proportion (45-64) 99.716 (167.818) 0.59 110.956 (171.135) 0.65 -313.390 (1003.778) -0.31 
Proportion - Black -50.071 (16.526) -3.03*** -45.293 (16.992) -2.67*** 1874.862 (810.805) 2.31** 
Proportion - Asian -47.724 (118.445) -0.40 -65.566 (121.691) -0.54 -3999.068 (1817.364) -2.20** 
Proportion - Amer Indian 
293.274 (55.120) 5.32*** 266.567 (57.229) 4.66*** -25157.630 (4864.013) 
-
5.17*** 
Proportion - Pacific 1839.159 (613.148) 3.00*** 1749.532 (634.577) 2.76*** -81004.590 (31775.800) -2.55** 
Proportion - Oth Race -799.957 (365.725) -2.19** -721.980 (380.186) -1.90* 22664.270 (5909.519) 3.84*** 
Proportion - Emp Ins -167.681 (51.632) -3.25*** -152.505 (51.706) -2.95*** -135.674 (177.827) -0.76 
Proportion - Priv Ins  -367.656 (60.889) -6.04*** -326.543 (60.915) -5.36*** -33.300 (212.861) -0.16 
Proportion - Medicaid -139.193 (58.999) -2.36** -118.809 (59.253) -2.01** -97.808 (211.124) -0.46 
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Proportion - Medicare -170.360 (110.995) -1.53 -141.525 (109.432) -1.29 -133.699 (246.130) -0.54 
Obesity  0.206 (0.295) 0.70 0.210 (0.293) 0.72 0.212 (0.778) 0.27 
Proportion - Smoke Daily -0.786 (0.401) -1.96** -0.718 (0.402) -1.79* 0.536 (1.733) 0.31 
Proportion - Drink Heavily 0.589 (0.764) 0.77 0.473 (0.767) 0.62 -0.224 (2.284) -0.10 
Child Death Rate -2.751 (1.991) -1.38 -2.454 (1.951) -1.26 -1.689 (4.421) -0.38 
Senator Mean -2.466 (7.515) -0.33 -1.948 (7.547) -0.26 11.397 (20.685) 0.55 
Senator Deviation -6.510 (2.741) -2.38** -6.983 (2.721) -2.57** -14.715 (6.328) -2.33** 
Number of Democratic 
Senators 0.048 (2.851) 0.02 0.064 (2.864) 0.02 -5.050 (8.148) -0.62 
Gov_demo 4.824 (1.545) 3.12*** 4.335 (1.529) 2.83*** -1.673 (3.796) -0.44 
Gov_ind -3.991 (6.316) -0.63 -4.716 (6.161) -0.77 -7.972 (13.597) -0.59 
Illegal Immigrant -10.290 (7.789) -1.32 -7.967 (7.809) -1.02 -3.759 (34.381) -0.11 
Median Income 0.644 (0.315) 2.05** 0.697 (0.314) 2.22** 1.500 (1.089) 1.38 
State ED Market -6.824 (2.272) -3.00*** -5.940 (2.260) -2.63*** -6.608 (9.346) -0.71 
Proportion - Inpatient Days - 
Medicare -47.045 (4.429) 
-
10.62*** -44.401 (4.512) -9.84*** -8.556 (15.723) -0.54 
Proportion - Inpatient Days - 
Medicaid -33.167 (3.799) -8.73*** -30.980 (3.841) -8.07*** -3.838 (10.259) -0.37 
Constant -644.118 (254.947) -2.53** -607.867 (261.232) -2.33** 1028.359 (2384.377) 0.43 
N 4452 
  
4452 
  
4452 
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APPENDIX  
 
Table A.1: Variable description and data source 
No Variables 
Detail 
Level Type Data source 
1 Inpatient Days Hospital Dependent www.aha.org 
2 
Hospital variables such as type of 
hospital (not for profit, government 
ownership, etc.), number of full 
time physicians and nurses, etc. Hospital Independent www.aha.org 
3 Extent of Con - stringent, None etc. State Independent Hellinger (2009) see reference section for more details 
4 CON Law characteristics  State Independent http://www.ahpanet.org/websites_copn.html 
5 Age distribution State Independent http://www.census.gov/popest/estbygeo.html 
6 Race Distribution State Independent 
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DatasetMainPageServlet?
_program=PEP 
7 Population  County Independent http://www.census.gov/popest/data/ 
8 Illegal immigrant State Independent 
http://immigrationroad.com/resource/illegal-immigrants-by-
state.php 
9 
% of uninsured, medicaid, medicare 
patients in state State Independent 
http://www.statehealthfacts.org/profileind.jsp?cmprgn=1&ca
t=3&rgn=12&ind=125&sub=39 
10 Percentage of obese population  State Independent www.cdc.gov 
11 
Percentage of population that smoke 
daily State Independent www.cdc.gov 
12 
Percentage of population that drink 
heavily State Independent www.cdc.gov 
13 Child death rate State Independent www.cdc.gov 
14 ED patient market State Independent http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/emergency-room-visits/ 
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15 
Inpatient days covered by Medicare 
and Medicaid State Independent www.aha.org 
16 Median Income State Independent http://www.bea.gov/regional/gsp/ 
17 GDP State Independent http://www.bea.gov/regional/gsp/ 
18 Senators State Voting Record State Independent http://www.adaaction.org/ 
19 Party in Power State Independent 
http://www.nga.org/cms/home/governors/past-governors-
bios.html;jsessionid=567B4C3B27E3CF6210B93BC608D3
FED5 
20 GINI coefficient State Instrumental www.census.gov 
21 Technology index State Instrumental http://www.milkeninstitute.org/tech/tech2010.taf?sub=tswf 
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Table A.2: Variable categorization and description 
Variable name Variable Description 
Outcome Variable 
 
Inpatient Utilization Measure built using Inpatient 
days and beds in a hospital 
 
Inpatient LOS Measure built using Inpatient 
days and Inpatient discharges 
from a hospital 
 
 
Independent Variables 
 
CON Law  
 
CON Indicator Dummy variable for con law 
coverage 
 
Stringency Index - Service Index of strictness of con 
threshold on service, can take 
values between 0 and 1 
 
Hospital Characteristics 
Full Time Physicians and Dentists Number of full time physicians 
and dentists in a hospital 
 
Full Time Nurses Number of full time nurses in a 
hospital 
Member of Council of Teaching Dummy variable – whether 
hospital is a member of council 
of teaching  
 
Resident Training Approval Dummy variable – whether 
hospital has approval for 
resident training 
 
JCAHO Accreditation Dummy variable – whether 
hospital has Joint Commission 
of Healthcare Organizations 
Accreditation (JCAHO) 
 
Not For Profit Dummy variable – whether 
hospital is not for profit  
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Government Ownership Dummy variable – whether 
hospital has government 
ownership  
 
Demographics 
 
Population Size Population size (millions) 
 
Proportion - Female Proportion of female 
 
Proportion (age 0-17) Proportion of people aged 17 or 
under 
 
Proportion (18-44) Proportion of people aged 
between 18 and 44 
 
Proportion (45-64) Proportion of people aged 
between 45 and 64 
 
Proportion - Black Proportion of population that is 
Black 
 
Proportion - Asian Proportion of population that is 
Asian 
 
Proportion - Amer Indian Proportion of population that is 
American Indian 
 
Proportion - Pacific Proportion of population that is 
Pacific Islander 
 
Proportion - Oth Race Proportion of population that 
belongs to two or more races 
 
Illegal Immigrant Illegal immigrants (millions) 
 
Health Status 
 
Obesity  Proportion of population that is 
obese 
 
Proportion - Smoke Daily Proportion of population that 
smoke daily 
 
Proportion - Drink Heavily Proportion of population that 
drink heavily 
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Child Death Rate Death rate of children 5 and 
under 
 
Health Care Access and Supply 
 
Proportion - Emp Ins Proportion of individuals with 
employer provided insurance 
 
Proportion - Priv Ins  Proportion of individuals with 
privately purchased insurance 
 
Proportion - Medicaid Proportion of individuals with 
Medicaid 
 
Proportion - Medicare Proportion of individuals with 
Medicare 
 
Proportion of Population – ED 
Services 
Proportion of State population 
that has availed Emergency 
Department Services 
 
TeachHosp_Num 
 
Number of Teaching Hospitals 
 
Economic  and Political Environment 
 
Median Income Median Income 
 
GDP State gross domestic product 
 
Senator Mean Mean of “yes” votes of the state 
senators  
 
Senator Deviation Absolute deviation in the voting 
record of the state senators 
 
Gov_demo Dummy variable of Democratic 
party governor 
 
Gov_ind Dummy variable of governor 
who is an Independent 
 
Unemployment Rate Self-explanatory 
 
Proportion - Inpatient Days - Proportion of Inpatientdays 
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Medicare covered by Medicare 
 
Proportion - Inpatient Days - 
Medicaid 
Proportion of Inpatientdays 
covered by Medicaid 
 
Instrumental Variables 
 
GINI Gini Index (measure of 
Inequality) 
 
Tech Index Index of Science & Technology  
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Table A.3: First stage regression of CON Indicator on exogenous variables 
  CON Law as Endogenous 
  Cross Sectional Random Effect 
Variables Coef. 
Std. 
Error 
Test 
Stat 
Coef. 
Std. 
Error 
Test Stat 
Full Time Physicians and Dentists -0.00001 (0.00003) -0.37 0.000003 (0.00003) 0.12 
Full Time Nurses 0.00001 (0.00001) 1.46 -0.000001 (0.00001) -0.11 
Member of Council of Teaching  -0.008 (0.009) -0.85 0.003 (0.009) 0.35 
Resident Training Approval -0.005 (0.005) -0.95 0.004 (0.005) 0.84 
JCAHO Accreditation 0.027 (0.004) 6.60*** 0.025 (0.004) 6.79*** 
Not For Profit 0.027 (0.004) 7.35*** 0.030 (0.004) 8.20*** 
Government Ownership 0.019 (0.011) 1.82* 0.011 (0.011) 1.01 
Population Size 
-0.086 (0.004) 
-
22.66*** -0.056 (0.003) 
-
20.22*** 
Proportion - Female 37.555 (0.929) 40.42*** 30.547 (0.855) 35.73*** 
Proportion (age 0-17) 
-12.324 (0.384) 
-
32.10*** -9.522 (0.325) 
-
29.31*** 
Proportion (18-44) 9.555 (0.402) 23.77*** 6.743 (0.332) 20.28*** 
Proportion (45-64) -1.851 (0.449) -4.12*** -0.656 (0.388) -1.69* 
Proportion - Black 0.620 (0.046) 13.50*** 0.918 (0.043) 21.43*** 
Proportion - Asian -0.186 (0.337) -0.55 2.115 (0.282) 7.49*** 
Proportion - Amer Indian 
-5.087 (0.169) 
-
30.15*** -5.675 (0.175) 
-
32.35*** 
Proportion - Pacific 15.694 (2.944) 5.33*** 15.523 (2.899) 5.36*** 
Proportion - Oth Race 31.668 (0.557) 56.85*** 27.849 (0.575) 48.43*** 
Proportion - Emp Ins 2.286 (0.127) 17.99*** 0.472 (0.093) 5.06*** 
Proportion - Priv Ins  
-2.583 (0.140) 
-
18.39*** -2.654 (0.111) 
-
24.00*** 
Proportion - Medicaid 1.771 (0.149) 11.85*** 0.015 (0.108) 0.14 
Proportion - Medicare -2.397 (0.288) -8.33*** -1.051 (0.189) -5.57*** 
Obesity  -0.002 (0.001) -2.00** -0.001 (0.001) -1.18 
Proportion - Smoke Daily 
-0.034 (0.001) 
-
25.58*** -0.013 (0.001) 
-
13.61*** 
Proportion - Drink Heavily 0.042 (0.002) 22.36*** 0.024 (0.001) 16.29*** 
Child Death Rate 
-0.076 (0.006) 
-
13.48*** -0.030 (0.004) -8.35*** 
Number of Teaching Hospitals 
-0.008 (0.0005) 
-
17.70*** -0.006 (0.0004) 
-
14.03*** 
Illegal Immigrant 0.225 (0.024) 9.49*** 0.021 (0.017) 1.23 
State ED Market 0.147 (0.006) 23.34*** 0.100 (0.005) 20.79*** 
Senator Mean 
-0.220 (0.020) 
-
10.97*** -0.070 (0.014) -5.00*** 
Senator Deviation 0.097 (0.007) 13.77*** 0.051 (0.005) 10.40*** 
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Number of Democratic Senators 0.156 (0.007) 21.49*** 0.084 (0.005) 16.08*** 
Gov_demo 0.032 (0.004) 8.03*** -0.014 (0.003) -5.30*** 
Gov_ind 
-0.330 (0.019) 
-
17.02*** -0.173 (0.012) 
-
13.99*** 
Median Income 0.008 (0.001) 9.71*** 0.003 (0.001) 4.59*** 
Proportion - Inpatient Days - 
Medicare -0.013 (0.009) -1.46 -0.011 (0.008) -1.44 
Proportion - Inpatient Days - 
Medicaid 0.020 (0.011) 1.79* 0.006 (0.009) 0.61 
Unemployment Rate 0.474 (0.135) 3.51*** -0.515 (0.089) -5.78*** 
GDP 0.367 (0.090) 4.09*** 0.138 (0.060) 2.29** 
Tech Index 
-0.025 (0.0003) 
-
73.00*** -0.015 (0.0003) 
-
54.95*** 
GINI 0.0002 (0.0001) 3.76*** -0.0001 (0.00004) -2.11** 
Constant -18.379 (0.639) -28.78 -14.256 (0.578) -24.66 
N 22963     22963     
 
*
 indicates statistical significance at the 10% level 
**
 indicates statistical significance at the 5% level 
***
 indicates statistical significance at the 1% level 
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Table A.4: First stage regression of CON Stringency on exogenous variables 
  CON Stringency as Endogenous 
  Cross Sectional Random Effect Fixed Effect 
Variables Coef. 
Std. 
Error 
Test 
Stat 
Coef. 
Std. 
Error 
Test 
Stat 
Coef. 
Std. 
Error 
Test 
Stat 
CON Indicator 0.232 (0.007) 33.59*** 0.274 (0.008) 35.04*** 
   
Full Time Physicians and Dentists 
-
0.00001 (0.00003) -0.38 
-
0.00001 (0.00003) -0.45 
-
0.00002 (0.00003) -0.75 
Full Time Nurses 
-
0.00002 (0.00001) -2.01** 
-
0.00002 (0.00001) -1.91* 0.00002 (0.00001) 1.69* 
Member of Council of Teaching  0.020 (0.009) 2.12** 0.016 (0.010) 1.55 -0.024 (0.015) -1.62 
Resident Training Approval -0.002 (0.006) -0.31 0.002 (0.006) 0.37 -0.012 (0.007) -1.74* 
JCAHO Accreditation 0.016 (0.004) 3.73*** 0.011 (0.004) 2.40** 0.009 (0.005) 2.03*** 
Not For Profit 0.009 (0.004) 2.41** 0.003 (0.004) 0.56 0.011 (0.008) 1.5 
Government Ownership -0.022 (0.011) -1.96** -0.018 (0.013) -1.34 0.040 (0.058) 0.68 
Population Size -0.021 (0.004) -5.23*** 0.026 (0.003) 7.81*** 0.076 (0.005) 14.43*** 
Proportion - Female -6.509 (1.059) -6.15*** -1.904 (1.093) -1.74* 65.701 (3.406) 19.29*** 
Proportion (age 0-17) 8.113 (0.420) 19.31*** 2.866 (0.395) 7.25*** 20.534 (0.986) 20.82*** 
Proportion (18-44) 6.019 (0.433) 13.91*** 6.855 (0.406) 16.90*** 38.784 (0.989) 39.21*** 
Proportion (45-64) 11.123 (0.487) 22.82*** 9.510 (0.469) 20.30*** 44.916 (1.056) 42.53*** 
Proportion - Black -0.465 (0.048) -9.64*** -0.335 (0.051) -6.51*** 11.777 (0.518) 22.74*** 
Proportion - Asian 
8.609 (0.386) 22.31*** 4.169 (0.356) 11.71*** -17.122 (1.211) 
-
14.14*** 
Proportion - Amer Indian 2.187 (0.181) 12.09*** 2.402 (0.213) 11.25*** 5.997 (3.152) 1.90* 
Proportion - Pacific 32.191 (3.348) 9.62*** 29.406 (3.805) 7.73*** 101.665 (33.626) 3.02*** 
Proportion - Oth Race 
-14.696 (1.165) 
-
12.62*** -10.750 (1.278) -8.41*** -7.410 (5.585) -1.33 
Proportion - Emp Ins 
0.148 (0.135) 1.10 -2.171 (0.113) 
-
19.26*** -3.896 (0.107) 
-
36.47*** 
Proportion - Priv Ins  
2.841 (0.156) 18.17*** 0.629 (0.138) 4.56*** -1.926 (0.151) 
-
12.78*** 
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Proportion - Medicaid 
0.552 (0.164) 3.38*** -1.765 (0.136) 
-
13.02*** -3.735 (0.129) 
-
29.06*** 
Proportion - Medicare 
4.521 (0.309) 14.64*** 0.934 (0.230) 4.06*** -1.898 (0.175) 
-
10.84*** 
Obesity  
-0.009 (0.001) 
-
10.93*** -0.003 (0.001) -5.33*** 0.000 (0.001) -0.6 
Proportion - Smoke Daily 0.012 (0.001) 8.66*** 0.001 (0.001) 0.65 -0.008 (0.001) -6.12*** 
Proportion - Drink Heavily 0.053 (0.002) 24.88*** 0.020 (0.002) 10.83*** -0.004 (0.002) -2.51** 
Child Death Rate -0.002 (0.006) -0.29 0.004 (0.005) 0.91 -0.011 (0.003) -3.32*** 
Number of Teaching Hospitals 
-0.016 (0.0005) 
-
34.11*** -0.011 (0.0005) 
-
23.17*** 
   
Illegal Immigrant 
-0.566 (0.025) 
-
22.52*** -0.619 (0.021) 
-
29.84*** -0.341 (0.023) 
-
14.96*** 
State ED Market 0.207 (0.007) 30.62*** 0.085 (0.006) 14.72*** -0.002 (0.007) -0.35 
Senator Mean 
-0.318 (0.021) 
-
14.98*** -0.159 (0.017) -9.47*** -0.149 (0.013) 
-
11.17*** 
Senator Deviation 
-0.035 (0.007) -4.68*** -0.028 (0.006) -4.76*** -0.050 (0.005) 
-
10.94*** 
Number of Democratic Senators 0.107 (0.008) 13.80*** 0.030 (0.006) 4.77*** 0.014 (0.005) 2.68*** 
Gov_demo 
-0.116 (0.004) 
-
26.94*** -0.049 (0.003) 
-
14.70*** -0.003 (0.003) -0.97 
Gov_ind -0.151 (0.020) -7.42*** -0.079 (0.015) -5.36*** 0.049 (0.011) 4.46*** 
Median Income 0.004 (0.001) 3.89*** 0.010 (0.001) 12.66*** 0.013 (0.001) 17.06*** 
Proportion - Inpatient Days - 
Medicare -0.038 (0.009) -4.16*** -0.019 (0.009) -2.06*** 0.006 (0.009) 0.68 
Proportion - Inpatient Days - 
Medicaid -0.023 (0.012) -2.01** -0.018 (0.011) -1.61 0.001 (0.010) 0.09 
Unemployment Rate 
-2.253 (0.143) 
-
15.71*** -0.926 (0.108) -8.60*** 2.241 (0.112) 20.00*** 
GDP 0.047 (0.095) 0.49 0.036 (0.072) 0.49 0.581 (0.066) 8.78*** 
Tech Index 
-0.010 (0.0004) 
-
23.58*** -0.011 (0.0004) 
-
30.90*** -0.011 (0.000) 
-
24.04*** 
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GINI 
-0.0003 (0.0001) -5.41*** -0.001 (0.0001) 
-
20.05*** -0.002 (0.000) 
-
40.65*** 
Constant -4.388 (0.693) -6.33 -3.116 (0.716) -4.35 
   N 21764     21764     21764     
*
 indicates statistical significance at the 10% level 
**
 indicates statistical significance at the 5% level 
***
 indicates statistical significance at the 1% level 
 
